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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
MASTER AND SERVANT.-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Ac.-Claimant was shot
after working hours, in a wash room, by a fellow worker with whom he had
previously been engaged in a dispute concerning their work. The fellow worker,
the aggressor, had abandoned his position with the company. Held, that the
injury arose "out of the employment," so as to entitle the injured man to re-
cover under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Franklin Coal and Coke Co.
v. Industrial Commission. (Ill., 1926), 152 N. E., 498.
When suit is brought to recover compensation under a Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act the question, as a rule, resolves itself into whether the injury "arose
out of" and "in the course of" the employment. Statutes in some states require
that the injury in order to be compensable must not only "arise out of," but
must be "in the course of" the employment. In re Sundine, 218 Mass., 1, 105
N. E., 433; Walther v. American Paper Co. (N. J.) 98 A., 264. On the other
hand, in some states statutes do not so provide as in the case of Bristow v. De-
partment of Labor, (Wash.) 246 Pac., 573. There an employee arrived at
work thirty-five minutes early and was killed while fishing for his own purpose
on his master's premises, and the court held his death compensable though not
caused by accident "arising out of" or "in the course of" his employment. A
dissenting judge said, "that he is not a workman if injured on the premises of
his employer engaged in some employment other than for his employer." The
court cites the case of Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 91 Wash.,
588, 158 Pac., 256, where it was held that only when the injury occurs away from
the employer's plant that the employee must be "in the course of his employ-
ment." The court in the Bristow case, supra, places its decision on the ground
that the statute does not require the injury to "arise out of" and "in the course
of" the employment. In cases where such words are in the statute they should
be construed liberally. Brady v. Oregon Lumber Co. (Ore.) 243 Pac., 96.
Courts do not, as a rule, disagree as to the fundamental principles necessary for
recovery under Workmen's Compensation Acts, but they sometimes disagree
as to the application of the law to the facts. "It may be said that an employee
is injured in the course of his employment when the injury occurs within the
period of his employment at a place where he may reasonably be, and while he
is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment, or is engaged in doing
something incidental to it." Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill., 11, 116
N. E., 684. "There must, however, be some causal relation between the em-
ployment and the injury. Although it need not be one which ought to have
been foreseen, it must be one which, after its occurrence, may be seen to have had
its origin in the nature of the employment." Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 285 Ill., 31, 120 N. E., 530; In re McNicol, 215 Mass., 497, 120 N.
E., 697. Generally, courts deny the claimant's right to recover in cases where
the injury was the result of horseplay. Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. Law.,
161, 91 Atl., 1007; Pierce v. Boyer Coal Co., 99 Neb., 321, 156 N. W., 509. In the
Pierce case the court held "that where an employee is assaulted by a fellow
worker, whether in anger or in play, an injury so sustained does not arise 'out of
the employment'." The case of Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277
11., 53, 115 N. E., 128, is, however, contra. A workman while in line to get his
pay was pushed from his place in the line and thrown to the ground thereby
injuring him, and the court held the employee was entitled to compensation as
the injury arose out of the servant's employment. Thus in each case, brought
to the attention of the court, a new set of facts present a new problem to be
solved in the light of the statute of the state as applicable to the particular
facts. E. C. F. '27.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANcEs REGULATING BILLBOARDS--AESTHETIC
CONSIDERATION.-The defendant was charged with the violation of a municipal
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ordinance which prohibited the erection within the municipality of all billboards
designed for advertising purposes, except signs of certain dimensions advertis-
ing realty for sale, or for rent. The county court convicted the defendant for
a violation of the ordinance sustaining the validity of the ordinance on aesthetic
grounds alone. On appeal, held, that the ordinance was invalid as being an un-
warranted exercise of police power, as depriving the owner of the free use of
his property, and as not tending to promote public safety, health, or general wel-
fare, People v. Wolf, (1926) 127 Misc., 382, 216 N. Y. S., 241.
In the United States, the courts have held almost uniformly that the police
power can not be exercised solely for aesthetic purposes. Curran v. Denver, 47
Colo., 221, 107 Pac., 261; Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Company, 188
Mass., 348, 74 N. E., 601 ; Passaic v. Patterson Bill Pasting Company, 72 N. J. L.,
285, 62 Atl.. 267; State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C., 542, 63 S. E., 123. Ordinances
prohibiting the erection of advertising signs near public parks and boulevards
have been held invalid as the unwarranted confiscation of private property to
promote beauty alone, rather than to protect public rights which are imperiled.
Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill., 628, 73 N. E., 1035; Haller Sign Works v.
Training School, 249 Ill., 436, 94 N. E., 920. In Isenbanth v. Bartnett, 206 App.
Div., 546, the court held that, "the aesthetic is a matter to be secured so far as
it may by private covenant without the backing of police power," and quoting
from the Haller Sign Works v. Training School, supra, the court said, "ad-
vancement along these lines (speaking of the aesthetic) has so far been left to
schools and colleges, and under the influence of social intercourse." Ordinances
prohibiting the erection of billboards in particular localities have been upheld
as being within the police power. Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U. S., 526; Gunning
v. St. Louis, 235 Mo., 99, 137 S. W., 929; St. Louis Poster Company v. St. Louis,
249 U. S, 269. Such ordinances do not bar billboards, however, by reason of
their offensiveness to the aesthetic senses, but primarily because signboards af-
ford increased hazards from fires, high winds, and interfere with the passage
of sunlight and air, thereby jeopardizing public interest. Within recent years,
increased population in urban districts has warranted an extension of the police
power as evidenced by zoning regulations. Wulfson v. Burden, 241 N. Y., 288,
150 N. E., 120; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S., 311. The courts in upholding the
zoning laws have been inclined to recognize, as incidental to the dominant factors
of public health and safety, the auxiliary element of beauty. Welsh v. Swasey,
193 Mass., 364, 79 N. E., 745; Cinello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So., 440;
State v. Haughton, 144 Minn., 1, 174 N. W., 885. Possibly the furtherest extreme
yet mentioned by any court is seen in the dissenting opinion of Judge Holt in
State v. Haughton, supra, where he said, "it is time the courts recognized the
aesthetic as a factor in life. Who will dispute that the general welfare of
dwellers in our congested cities is promoted if they be allowed to have their
homes in fit and harmonious or beautiful surroundings?" J. R. B. '28.
SUNDAY LAws--AcTs OF NECESSITY OR CHARITY-GASOLINE NOT "NECESSITY."
-Defendant was indicted for violating a city ordinance which prohibited, under
penalty, the sale of goods, wares and merchandise on Sunday, and provided that
"charity or necessity on the part of the customer may be shown in justification
of the violation of this ordinance." Defendant opened his filling station on the
Sabbath day to dispense gasoline to physicians, officers of the law, tourists, and
patrons of his garage which he ran in connection with the filling station. Al-
though defendant sold gasoline only to those who signed statements that it was
necessary for them to have it, the particular circumstances under which the
sales were made did not appear in the record. The circuit judge instructed the
jury to return a verdict of guilty and defendant appeals on ground that this
being the motor age, the sale of gasoline on Sunday is an inherent, essential, and
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